Berlin Crisis of 1961 from Perspective of Realism Theory Essay

Berlin Crisis of 1961 was the most dangerous moment of the Cold War. This conflict was mainly about the occupational status of Berlin. Berlin Crisis initially emerged in 1958 by the provocation of the Soviet Union. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev threatened to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany unless the western powers recognized the Germany Democratic Republic (GDR) (I. W. Trauschweizer, 2006). However, the escalation of tensions began after the Vienna Summit in June 1961, where the USSR again raised the issue of ultimatum, which gave the United States six months for the withdrawal of Western armed forces from West Berlin. Berlin Crisis was not the only crisis during Cold War. Through the whole history of humanity there has always been a question why do wars and conflicts occur? In order to give an answer to this question we should explain some factors which made the war to occur. Crisis and especially Berlin Crisis can be understood from several perspectives, but in this paper it will be explained from realism theory perspective. As a famous representative of realism theory, Waltz asked himself the question why do wars occur? Waltz’s question is as old as war itself, possibly because â€Å"to explain how peace can be more readily achieved requires an understanding of the causes of war† (Waltz, 1959: 2). By the time Waltz posed this question, many answers to it already existed. These answers fell into three categories (or as IR theorists came to define them, were found at the three â€Å"levels of analysis† or in the â€Å"three images†). These three categories/levels/images are: the individual, the state, and the state system† (C.  Weber, 2009, p. 17). These main causes of conflict will be represented in detail in the main body of the paper by the example of Berlin Crisis. Although Waltz’s three categories of the causes of war explained many processes in the Berlin Crisis, there are also important points in the theory of realism, which typically explain Berlin Crisis, one of those points is the issue of bipolarity or multipolarity of the world. Morgenthau, an American academic and journalistic writer, in contrast to Waltz saw the stable world in multipolar rather than in a bipolar system. From his perspective bipolarity was dangerous for the world’s stability, because as we will see next, Berlin Crisis was the result of bipolar system, where two great powers tried to dominate the others, by increasing their power and authority. As Waltz said, each great power sought to survive. Thus, realism theory explained Berlin Crisis from many points of view. In order to better understand Berlin Crisis of 1961 from realism theory perspective, I will present the main points of realism theory. After, I will give a short historical background of Berlin Crisis and to summarize all these, I will illustrate how well realism theory explained the Berlin Crisis. The Realism Theory The most dominant theory throughout the Cold War was realism. Realism had a negative viewpoint concerning to abolishment of conflict and war. It described international relations as a struggle for power. The domination of realism during the Cold War was due to the fact that it gave simple but powerful explanation for war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, and other international phenomena, and of course, the competition was mainly related with the features of the American-Soviet rivalry (S. M. Walt, 1998). However the realist thought developed during the Cold War. †Classical† realists such as Hans Morgenthau considered that states, as human beings, had a wish to dominate others, which brings about a war. Giving advantage to multipolarity, Morgenthau considered that the bipolar rivalry between United States and the Soviet Union was very dangerous (S. M. Walt, 1998). â€Å"In contrast to â€Å"classical† realism, the â€Å"neorealist† theory, advanced by Kenneth Waltz, ignored human nature and focused on the effects of the international system (S. M. Walt, 1998, p. 31)†. He claimed that international system included great powers, which were seeking to stay alive. In contrast to Morgenthau, Waltz considered bipolar system more stable than multipolarity. When there are more than two poles, things get trickier. Balances are harder to strike and therefore risks increase, which brought about the wars (C. Weber, 2009). One of the most important features of realism is a theory of offence-defense. It was developed by Robert Jervis, George Quester and Stephen Van Evera. â€Å"When defense had the advantage and states could distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons, then states could acquire the means to defend themselves, without threatening others† (S. M. Walt, 1998, p. 31). â€Å"Defensive† realists thought that all states were seeking to survive and in this case, by creating alliances and adopting self-protective military position, great owers could solve their security problems. And as an example, Waltz and other neo-realists thought that the United States was protected and secured during the Cold War. Realists and neo-realists agreed that the prime aim of states was to survive and the increase of their power is the only way to guarantee their survival, because states with less power might fear of those with more power and therefore the possibility to attack them was the minimum. Besides, realists and neo-realists agreed that there was no possibility to get out from international anarchy. However there was one thing they disagree about: the issue of human nature. For example, Morgenthau argued that the nature of a man (and he meant the gender exclusive term â€Å"man†; see Tickner, 1992: Chapter 2) was defective and international politics would remain anarchical and conflictual because of the nature of man. Neorealists, of whom Kenneth Waltz was the first, disagreed with this consideration. â€Å"They argue that instead of looking to â€Å"natural† causes of conflict, we need to look to â€Å"social† ones (C. Weber, 2009, p. 16). ’ Waltz thought that the organization of social relations and not the nature of man determined there was a war or not, because states go to war as they are in a bad social organization. So, for realists, international anarchy was just the environment in which sovereign nation-states acted. For neo-realists, international anarchy described the social relations among sovereign nation-states, which explained why wars arise. By the end of the Cold War, realism had moved away from Morgenthau’s gloomy human nature and was taken on a little more positive stage (S.  M. Walt, 1998). Historical Background of Berlin Crisis After World War II Germany was divided– first into four sectors, with American, British, French and Soviet, and then into two, as the three Western sectors coalesced to form the new Federal Republic of Germany, leaving the Soviet sector to turn into the German Democratic Republic (John P. S. Gearson, K. Schake, 2002). And during this period Germany had two major cresses, but the 1961 Berlin crisis was generally perceived to be more dramatic and dangerous than its 1958 predecessor. The Kennedy Administration was more inclined than its predecessor to consider East–West disagreement over the Berlin crisis. President Kennedy gave a speech to the nation about preparing for war and began a $3. 4 billion military build-up in the summer of 1961. Both the US and the Soviet forces had a dramatic confrontation at a military checkpoint in Berlin. â€Å"Initially, The Berlin Crisis began in 1958, when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev threatened to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany unless the western powers recognized the Germany Democratic Republic (GDR) † (I.  W. Trauschweizer, 2006, 206). However, the main crisis heated through 1961. It escalated at the Vienna summit between Khrushchev and Kennedy in June 1961, when Khrushchev again raised issue of his ultimatum. Kennedy left Vienna shaken and expected the worst from the Soviet leader. He decided to increase the personal strength of US armed forces in Europe. However, the first step of aggression did the Soviet Union. On 13 August, East German police units closed the border between the Soviet sector and the three western sectors of Berlin. The construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 was one of the defining moments of the Cold War, and heightened the sense of tension. It was the moment when the crisis was stabilized. Even as it became increasingly apparent that Berlin was unlikely to provide a hot war, it provided the Cold War with its most conspicuous symbol, a regular stop for any visit to the city, a chance to stand and look over into a grey east and compare it with the wealth behind (John P. S. Gearson, K. Schake, 2002). The division of Berlin and building a wall was a shock for the Kennedy administration. Most of the United States government officials were expecting that the crisis would revolve, but there were some in the administration who thought that the East German government would take measures to stop the flow of refugees from East Germany, and they believed that the border closing might reduce tensions rather than lead to escalation. In order to enforce his influence in Western part of Berlin Kennedy decided to appoint Clay, who was a chairman of the Continental Can Company in New York, as his Special Representative in Berlin with the rank of Ambassador. Kennedy considered sending Clay to Berlin for the duration of the crisis in order to boost morale in the city, but also to create conditions that would persuade Soviet leaders to join in serious negotiations (I. W. Trauschweizer, 2006). The stand-off of Soviet and American tanks in the heart of Berlin in October 1961, constituted the most dangerous moment of the Cold War in Europe and it was one of the last major politico-military incidents of Cold War. As per standing orders, both groups of tanks were loaded with live munitions. The lert levels of the US Garrison in West Berlin, then NATO and finally the US Strategic Air Command were raised and both groups of tanks had orders to fire if fired upon. Clay was convinced that using US tanks as bulldozer to knock down parts of the Wall would have ended the Crisis to the greater advantage of the US and its allies without drawing out a Soviet military response. His views, and corresponding evidence that the Soviets may have backed down following this action, supported a more critical assessment of Kennedy’s decisions during the crisis and his willingness to accept the Wall- as the best solution. After, Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed to reduce tensions by withdrawing the tanks. One by one the tanks withdrew and Clay returned to the United States in May 1962. Anyway, there was no doubt that the Berlin Crisis and in general, the Cold War was really over when the Wall came down in November 1989. Berlin Crisis from Realism Theory Perspective As the most dominate theory during the Cold War was the realism we easily can view Berlin crisis from the perspective of this theory, because Berlin crisis was one of the major conflicts during the Cold War. Realism explained many processes of Berlin Crisis, but there were some miscalculations concerning to it. All about these will be represented in this part of the paper. The main competition in the world realism theory saw between the United States and the Soviet Union. Realists claimed that bipolar system of world was very dangerous and gave an advantage to multipolarity. Thus, the bipolar system was very typical during Berlin Crisis, but from the neorealism perspective the bipolar world was more stable. Here neorealists had a miscalculation, because during Berlin Crisis bipolarity dominated in the world and history shows that tensions were more escalated than ever. Thus, from this point of view realists’ thoughts more corresponded to reality, than that of the neorealists. From the perspective of realism theory states must have power in order to survive. United States and Soviet Union tried to do so by strengthening the power in Europe. According to Morgenthau human beings sought to get power and to dominate others. The Berlin Crisis was good example for this idea. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were doing everything to get more power in Europe and to dominate each other. After Vienna’s summit, tensions came obvious and the first reaction of both great powers was how not to lose power over Berlin. The result was the Berlin conflict. The building of Berlin wall can be described by the wish of great powers to survive in this situation and the increase of power was the main guarantee for survival. From the perspective of realism theory fear also made these two great powers to dominate in Berlin. Both the United States and the Soviet Union took actions from fear of losing a power. After Vienna summit Kennedy was shocked and expected everything from Soviet Union. And the fear of not losing a power made Kennedy to turn to drastic actions by increasing the power over Berlin. Berlin Crisis was a result of using force. Here is the good example of Acheson’s report â€Å"The Soviets would provoke a crisis in Berlin to take advantage of US conventional force inadequacies and humiliate the new Administration† (John P. S. Gearson, K. Schake, 2002, p. 31). In the Realism theory there was another important element of aggression during the Cold War. This kind of behavior we can see from the United State’s side. National Security Adviser Mc. George Bundy endorsed the Acheson report, urging the president that â€Å"Berlin is no place for compromise and our general friendliness and eagerness for improvement on many other points really requires strength here in order to be rightly understood† (John P. S. Gearson, K. Schake, 2002, p. 31). The aggressive tone of the Acheson approach and its support in the Administration contrasted with the political compromises President Kennedy wanted to be in Berlin, but Khrushchev’s belligerent behavior at the Vienna summit convinced the president of the Acheson argument. However, whatever the positions of both sides were â€Å"The Berlin crises of 1958 and 1961 suggested that the range of political choice was defined less by military capabilities than by the nature of the political conflict that gave rise to the use of force and by the willingness of adversaries to accept risk in order to achieve their political goals† (John P. S. Gearson, K. Schake, 2002, p. 38). However why did this crisis occur? Waltz asked himself a question like this one: why do wars occur in general? The answers to this question fell into three categories: the individual, the state, and the state system. Waltz argued that the major causes of war could be found at each of these categories and none of them alone could explain why wars do or do not occur. He came to this conclusion by beginning to look at the first category- a man. From the first category Waltz explained the war like this â€Å"the locus of the important causes of war is found in the nature and behavior of man. War results from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity†¦ If these are the primary causes of war, then the elimination of war must come through uplifting and enlightening men or securing their psychic-social readjustment† (Waltz, 1959: 16). This idea is common with the behavior of Kennedy and Khrushchev during Berlin Crisis. In the basis of this conflict a nature and behavior of both Kennedy and Khrushchev can be found. They both had an aggressive behavior. Explanation of war of â€Å"men behaving badly† is very typical for Khrushchev, when in June 1961 Khrushchev again raised the issue of his ultimatum, which claimed an immediate withdrawal of US armed forces from Berlin. â€Å"Man behaves badly because he is bad by nature. He acts unreasonably or he prioritizes selfish goals over communitarian goals, and this is why conflicts and wars occur† (C. Weber, 2009, p. 17). As we already know for Waltz man alone cannot causes wars. He thought that man’s nature was too complex to be the direct and main cause for war. For the Berlin Crisis we can conclude the same. Even the great players of this crisis were the United States and the Soviet Union leading with Kennedy and Khrushchev, only their nature and behavior were not enough to incite conflict. Thus, we can look to social and political institutions to complete our understanding of why wars occur and especially why Berlin crisis occurred. Waltz asked whether the occurrence of wars could be explained by the internal organization of states and societies. Second category theorists argued that there are good and bad states, because of their formal governmental arrangements: for example, democratic vs. autocratic or their less formal social arrangements, who owned the means of production. Second image theories claimed that bad actors (this time states) make war, and good actors preserve the peace. However, there is no common answer which is a bad one and which is good, because some suggested good states would be democratic, others say they should be monarchical, others still say socialist. Waltz suggested, even if second image theorists could agree on what a good state was, there was still no guarantee that a world of â€Å"good states† would be a peaceful world. From this viewpoint realism theory could not explain which kind of state was good or bad, and we cannot say the democratic America or the socialist Soviet Union were the causes of the risis. Waltz concluded that this level of analyses was incomplete. For the third category he gave linkages between anarchy, state actions and conflict. â€Å"In anarchy there is no automatic harmony†¦ A state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace. Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies. Because any state may at any time use force, all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay the cost of weakness (Waltz, 1959: 160)† (C. Weber, 2009, p. 18). Waltz called bad social organization international anarchy. International anarchy is the permissive cause of war† (C, Weber, 2009, p. 16). From this viewpoint realism described the social organization of states and the cause why crisis started. Taking into account the ideas of Waltz, that in the world there was international anarchy, we can say that Berlin crisis was the result of it. These can bring about the idea that both United States and Soviet Union were in bad social organization. Waltz concluded that wars occur, because there is nothing to prevent it. So, for Waltz, international anarchy explained both why wars may occur and why there are limits on cooperation among states in the international system. Waltz argued that only international anarchy has the power to explain why wars may occur, if individuals and states have nothing to fear from one another, then they have no cause to fight with one another. This idea can be linked with the fear of Kennedy, when he left Vienna. He was expecting anything from the Soviet Union and the fear made him to strength the military personal of US armed forces in Berlin. He wanted to survive by maximizing power. Waltz believed that we need to look at â€Å"social† causes of conflict rather than on â€Å"natural†. He explained that good men behave badly in bad social organizations, and bad men can be stopped from behaving badly if they are in good social organizations. States go to war, then, because they are in a bad social organization. From the realism perspective the United States also had bad social organization, because the Kennedy Administration did not understand the 1961 crisis in these political terms. They viewed Soviet pressure on Berlin as a military challenge to declining US superiority, and concentrated their efforts on military responses. The Administration began a series of defense improvements and public commentary that exacerbated the instability of the East German regime and raised US–Soviet tensions. They abandoned this confrontational approach in August of 1961 when the Berlin Wall was constructed, opting instead to reduce US–Soviet tensions by supporting the long-term division of Germany (John P. S. Gearson, K. Schake, 2002). â€Å"While it is questionable whether the Kennedy Administration, new to office and without Eisenhower’s war fighting credibility, could have succeeded with the Eisenhower approach to Berlin, the stridency with which the Kennedy Administration approached the crisis exacerbated the problem, both with the Soviet Union and among the Western allies. The US failure to follow through on its hard-line approach when the Berlin Wall was built raised serious questions about the practicality of the Kennedy Administration’s new military strategy and the reliability of the US for its European allies† (John P. S. Gearson, K. Schake, 2002, p. 22). As we can see the main purpose of this conflict was to get power. Morgenthau said that â€Å"The struggle for power is universal in time and space† (Morgenthau 1948: 17) (J. Donnelly, 2004, p. 10). Waltz also shared an opinion concerning to power â€Å"The daily presence of force and recurrent reliance on it mark the affairs of nations† (Waltz 1979: 186) (J.  Donnelly, 2004, p. 10). Structural realists give predominant emphasis to international anarchy. For example, John Herz argued that international anarchy assures the centrality of the struggle for power â€Å"even in the absence of aggression or similar factors† (Herz 1976: 10; compare Waltz 1979: 62–63) (J. Donnelly, 2004, p. 10). The Berlin Crisis was vivied example of sharing the the power between two great powers and the thought of Waltz that states need a power in order to survive is very typical for Berlin Crisis. Conclusion To summarize all above mentioned I would like to say that the realism theory, which was the dominant one during the Cold War, explained many processes of Berlin Crisis. In general it gave important answers about Berlin Crisis. Realism emphasized the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government. Together, they make international relations largely a realm of power and interest (J. Donnelly, 2004, p. 9). All realists emphasize the egoistic passions and self-interest in politics. The realists put emphasis on power and claimed that states need the power in order to survive. In case of Berlin Crisis, United States and Soviet Union maximized their power in order to get a dominant role in Europe. At the same time fear also made them to turn to radical actions. Especially United States increased the US armed forces in Berlin. So the combination of the wish to have more power and a fear to lose a power can be viewed as the causes of conflict. From the realism theory perspective there were also elements of aggression through Cold War, especially during Berlin Crisis. The aggression can be found in both United State’s and Soviet Union’s actions. However, the main reasons why this conflict occurred were described by Waltz. He represented the conflict by three categories. For him the three categories combined can made war to occur, but in general the first and the second categories can explain the Berlin Crisis. The third one, even cannot distinguish which is good state and which one is bad: in the case of Berlin Crisis we cannot say United States was good and Soviet union was bad or vice versa. Anyway, Waltz argued that good men behave badly in bad social organizations, and bad men can be stopped from behaving badly if they are in good social organizations. States go to war, then, because they are in a bad social organization (John P. S. Gearson, K. Schake, 2002). The only thing Waltz had miscalculation about was the multipolar system, because he saw the stabile world within the framework of bipolar system, but in reality, during Berlin Crisis bipolar world was very dangerous. We can conclude that realism theory managed to explain the Berlin Crisis from many points of view. There were some issues during Berlin Crisis, which realism theory could not cover, but the main aspects of it can be easily described from the realism theory perspective. To summarize the thoughts of major thinkers of realism and neorealism theory, which characteristically explained the Berlin Crisis, we can say that for Waltz the state’s interest provides the spring of action and the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states and calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interests. For Morgenthau, politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature and the main mark that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. Thus, power and interest are variable in content (J. Donnelly, 2004).